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The World Bank and International Monetary Fund eventually seem to agree on the 
date (November) of discussion of "Moldovan triennial" or Economic Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (2004-2006), which also took the government three years 
for its preparation. Most probably the Fund and Bank will approve this strategy and 
then our Parliament will put it into a legal document, the more so as the first year of 
this triennial comes to an end.  
 
 
Do we switch to reforms of a new type?  
 
Meanwhile, it was in parliament where a new initiative was stated: i.e. a transition to 
new type reforms. First this was said by the President V.Voronin at the close of 
summer session (on 28.07.2004) and then supported by speaker E.Ostapciuc at the 
opening of an autumn parliament session on 23.09.2004: "We are to initiate reforms 
of new types that would facilitate a more sustainable development".  
 
The essence and methods of realization of the reforms of a new type yet to be 
interpreted. Still, it is encouraging that the President has acknowledged that the 
reforms should continue since the very fact of "both social stabilization and economic 
growth does not mean anything in a poor country". And this is true. GDP growth has 
resumed in Moldova since 2000 (its increase came to about 34% in 2000-2004) and 
this happened while the employment reduced (!) by 10%. Only about 40% of the 
growth was brought out by industry and agriculture; its growth was mainly caused by 
service sector, a rise in consumption and taxes levied on goods and import. Besides it 
was influenced by remittances transferred by our fellow citizens working abroad. It is 
clear that this pattern of growth guarantees the country neither sustainable 
development nor high rate of growth of GDP nor social rehabilitation of the 
population.  
 
 
From equality to inequality  
 
The assertion of Moldova being the poorest country of Europe became a stereotype. 
Here it should be added that such drastic social inequality between the new rich and 
the new poor has not evolved in any of the other 14 post socialistic countries of the 
Central-East Europe as it has happened in Moldova. After 1990 income inequality in 
terms of Gini coefficient applied by UNO has doubled and reached 40-44.  
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Thus, in the mid of 2004 only 6.2% of total household income volume fell to the share 
of 20% less secured families and 44.2% - to the share of 20% the most well-to-do 
families. Recent years revival of the dynamics has reduced a poverty zone in Moldova 
but it has not removed contrasts of inequality.  
 
Nevertheless the majority of citizens of the RM still remember realia of a "developed 
socialism", when the state secured relative equality of incomes that basically 
depended on a salary (except nomenclature' privileges and "blat" - profitable 
connections).  
 
Inequality began to increase rapidly during the transition period. At first it was caused 
by the fact that many people lost jobs and their money saving, and then - by process 
of privatization of enterprises, land and dwelling. Salaries paid in certain sectors 
became sharply different. Moreover, entrepreneurs have derived an income from 
shadow economy and employees of public offices - from corruption.  
 
In Moldova in 1997-2003 real salaries grew annually by 7.7% starting from the mid 
90s and after 1999 they have risen on average by 14.7% per year. On the other hand, 
at the same time the contrasts became even sharper. If in 1996 salaries in agriculture 
made up 2/3 of average salaries of national economy, then in 2003 they already came 
to ½. The same tendency took place in education and public health sectors. In 2003 
salaries that exceeded an average level were paid in construction, transportation, 
industrial and financial sectors and public administration.  
 
It is strange, but remittances sent from abroad also spurred the inequality. As the most 
initiative and educated part of the population went abroad for earning, 70 % of 
remittances get to well-to-do households. These remittances are spent mainly for 
consumption and also for "family investments" - for children education, purchase of 
apartments, land and investment into small business. Additionally, state social 
programmes do not facilitate much to elimination of inequality. Rendering of 
assistance in the programmes is based on a principle when citizens are assigned 
categories but it is not based on their real needs.  
 
As a result, according to the Ministry of economy estimates (2003) only 6.6% of 
social transfers (without pensions) fell to the share of 20% less secured families and 
46.0% to the most well-to-do families - recipients of such assistance.  
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Images of inequality  
 
Inequality is many-sided. The tenseness of the situation also consists in that the 
inequality becomes apparent not only through contrasts in incomes or availability of 
property (which is an obvious sign for today), but through unequal conditions of 
access to the future - access to education and health care.  
 
According to the sociologists data (2003) the number of days spent by the poor and 
the well-to-do in hospital are in the ratio of 1:11. The number of matriculated persons 
from the poor is tree times less than the number of matriculated persons from the 
well-to-do. Only every tenth is matriculated from the village youth that apply for 
admission to institutions of higher learning, while from the town-dwellers - every 
second.  
 
It should be mentioned that the inequality in job opportunities available in Chisinau 
municipality (small business, construction, service and security sectors) and persistent 
stagnation for the rest of the territory, except 3-5 other towns (Edinet, Balti, Ungheni 
and Cahul).  
 
Thus, many of the rights of citizens declared by our new democratic Constitution 
(1994) are difficult to realize. Thereby life of many people, especially young 
generation, is dominated by sense of vulnerability, impossibility to plan their future.  
 
 
What is to be done?  
 
One should not assert that the government does not see the inequality as a dangerous 
reason of social and political tension. Thus, in EG-PRSP for 2004-2006 "elimination 
of inequality and increase in participation of the poor in economic development" are 
mentioned as the priority. Basic approaches for this are well-known and approved in 
countries that undergo active reforms in transition:  
 
• To increase employment for those who want and are able to work, to stimulate 
opening of new jobs - especially in a sector of small and medium business;  
• To focus attention of the central government and administration of regions on 
the poorest localities;  
• To make social assistance targeted for those who really need the state support.  
 
At present the draft budget for 2005 is considered in Parliament. Again, the 
Government mentions that the state budget is "real and socially oriented". But to 
whom is it directed toward? Confucius said: "in a well-governed state they are 
ashamed of poverty, in a poorly ruled state they are afraid of wealth". Inequality is a 
real danger for a young, weak state. Or we are neither ashamed nor afraid?  
 3
What's in their for us in the draft budget for 2005? 
Iurie Gotisan, 3 November 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 40, 18 October - 31 October, 2004 
 
 
The recently approved draft budget, which was said to be socially-oriented and 
pursuing objectives outlined in the Government Action Plan, is yet another evidence 
to Governments' incapacity to translate Communist Party's ideological message and 
political preferences into a budgetary vision. As it is primarily a political document 
and given approaching elections, the spending for the budgetary sphere has rose 
insignificantly by 340 million Lei, in particular for education, healthcare, and social 
security.  
 
Moreover, considerable funds are to be allotted next year to special state services, 
public order, national defence - 23% of the total budget spending. Excessive funding 
of the force structures speaks for itself - incumbent power seeks to improve social-
economic conditions in a rather specific manner, rather than by passing and enforcing 
laws that would spot and prevent various forms of corruption and embezzlement.  
 
On the last 100 metres, budget for this year might be further undercut by some 
unforeseen spending that the Government had to assume. On top of that, during last 
week Government session Minister of Finance announced that due to the failure to 
collect all forecasted taxes, there was a budget "whole" worth 1 billion Lei in the state 
budget for this year. Having said this, it is very likely the macroeconomic targets set 
for the next year would not be met.  
 
The fact that Moldova doesn't have a functional market economy would make all the 
problems even worse in an electoral year and would likely undermine all the social-
oriented "moves" envisaged in the draft budget for 2005. The mere mention of 
"elections" brings the draft budget in the centre of electorate and contestants' attention 
with both of them seeking to exploit it to their own advantage, i.e. the former to ask 
the latter to provide or promise.  
 
If we are to look back at the developments since September, the first to claim their 
rights were teachers who threatened to go on strike. And the timing was perfect, 
beginning of the school year. Government yielded and raised wages by 20%. On top 
of that on the last 100 metres before draft budget approval, Government took over 
even more of a burden: indemnifying pensions; raising allocations, compensations 
and indemnities; all in all an estimated at 890 million Lei. What the Government 
didn't do was to take into account fluctuating prices on raw materials and oil on the 
international market.  
 
All of the aforesaid would wield a heavy pressure on achieving the targets set for the 
next year, namely: a 6% economic growth and keeping inflation below 9%. It's 
difficult to asses the impact of the swelling budget spending, as nobody works 
seriously with economic modelling in Moldova and there is not enough statistics data.  
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Early this year, a part of the healthcare employees agreed to adjourn negotiations on 
wages for the next year, however they have changed their mind lately seizing the right 
moment. As one government official put it, one cannot go to the polling stations when 
people are rallying nearby. Therefore, Government would have again to dig deep into 
its pockets and come up with new amendments to the draft budget so as to ease the 
spirits.  
 
Yet once again, ruling party's generous promises are confronted with economic 
realities. Previously, ruling party's generosity was tempered by financial isolation 
brought by worsening relations with international monetary organisations. Recent 
decisions of the International Monetary Fund, currently with a mission in Moldova, to 
adjourn discussions on our country spoiled any hopes for an aid from abroad, or at 
least for an aid in the first half of 2005. Moldova would find it difficult to service 
foreign debt as well as to finance foreign deficit, i.e. trade balance and current account 
deficit.  
 
Draft budget for 2005 promises lowering fiscal burden for legal and natural entities 
alike. In particular it promises to cut by 2% the income tax for legal entities, from 
20% in 2004 to 18% in 2005; and income tax quotas for natural entities from 10%, 
15% and 22% in 2004 to 9%, 14% and 20% in 2005. Ministry of Finance estimated 
that the move would roughly cost 1 billion Lei. Potentially, the move would pay back 
by surging investments from Moldovan business.  
 
Apparently, the state lets the fiscal burden loose. In reality, envisaged moves would 
not reform taxation system, while their impact remains unclear. Moldovan officials 
keep promising jobs and wage-raise. However, draft budget paints a less robust 
picture, social contribution would drop from 28% to 27%, healthcare insurance would 
go up by 2%, and most importantly the idea of a single taxation quota was abandoned.  
Reinvesting profits, amidst lowering income tax from 20% to 18%, would rather be a 
constraint. An income tax as low as 18% might lure foreign investors. If this was the 
intention of the Government, then it fades when compared to 15% income tax in the 
region. On the contrary, ambiguous laws, bureaucracy, not to speak of the rule of law 
would scare any investor away.  
 
Although it is said to be socially-oriented, the current draft budget follows fiscal and 
budgetary policies of the previous years. One of the rules of economic policies says 
that budget is a financial reflection of the state policies, but it seems this rule doesn't 
work in Moldova. Macroeconomic indicators used in drafting the budget for the next 
year, which Prime-Minister likes bragging about, have induced ecstasy among 
legislators. Unfortunately, Moldovan economy is not as healthy as Tarlev's 
Government wants to see it. Allegorically speaking, there is only one step to go from 
ecstasy to agony.  
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Financial rating and foreign competitiveness of Moldova 
Iurie Gotisan, 18 November 2004  
 
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 41, November 1-14, 2004 
 
 
Following the visit Fitch experts to the Republic of Moldova, the agency reexamined 
long-term rating for the Republic of Moldova. The country rating would remain 
unchanged, i.e. B-, and this because Moldovan Government has a limited capacity to 
contract foreign loans and therefore has to tight its public spending.  
 
Moreover, Fitch experts say the pace of reforms in Moldova is too slow, privatization 
is carried inadequately, public debt is swelling, whereas relations with IMF have been 
frozen. 'B' ratings indicate that significant credit risk is present, but a limited margin 
of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity 
for continued payment is contingent upon a sustained, favorable business and 
economic environment. Republic of Moldova bears many risks as regards 
investments. Therefore, general tendency of Moldova's credibility index seems quite 
bleak.  
 
Entities or issues carrying the same rating are of similar but not necessarily identical 
credit quality, still interestingly enough Moldova lags behind all CIS countries, apart 
from Turkmenistan having a CCC- rating. Also, experts were concerned about high 
trade balance deficit reaching 515 million USD in the first nine months of the year. 
Even considerable remittances of Moldovans working abroad, as well as transfer to 
current account, were not able to slow down the swelling deficit.  
 
According to the Ministry of Finance, in January - October 2004 Republic of 
Moldova reimbursed foreign debt worth 93 million USD. At the same time, to address 
the debt issue, Parliament amended the Law on State Budget, thereby enabling 
National Bank to grant a 50 million USD loan to the Government for it to redeem 
foreign debt. After all, it is not the mission of the National Bank to credit and fill 
budget wholes from its foreign currency reserves.  
 
The move would propel inflation up and depreciate national currency. This has 
happened in Latin America in the 80's when the country's insolvency coupled with 
interference of politics in financial system resulted in the highest inflation ever. Going 
back to Moldova, amidst worsening relations with foreign creditors and IMF 
reluctance to credit policies spurring inflation, such moves not only will be useless in 
putting the fire down, but on the contrary would fuel it, as there are no guarantees that 
Government would reimburse the credit.  
 
Given the lack on internal a sources, an alternative solution might be the urgent 
restructuring of foreign debt by means of Paris Club. However, good relations with 
IMF is a binding condition for the debtor to meet in order to initiate restructuring 
negotiations, which is not exactly the case of Moldova. Therefore, in order to 
restructure debts, Moldova would have to keep the path of reforms and most 
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importantly observe the Memorandum signed with the Fund, especially as Moldova 
already managed to breach some of the provisions. On the other hand, similarly to  
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international monetary organisations putting forward conditions Moldova should 
comply with, the state itself should act likewise with its debtors. Generally speaking, 
Government should be more persistent when dealing with administration of state 
enterprises, especially when privatization is not a solution.  
 
From the time IMF mission left Moldova on November 3, it was clear that the country 
would not get foreign funding at least until mid-2005, which bears some risks for the 
economy. At the same time, according to officials from Ministry of Finance revenues 
provided for in the state budget would be revised, that is reduced. This would in turn 
bring some changes in the expenditures. At this time Government has a narrow berth 
for manoeuvres, especially as Minister of Finance stated earlier that because of lower 
revenues than forecasted there was a 1 billion Lei budget "whole".  
 
Moreover, the forecasts I made in the previous issue of e-journal that macroeconomic 
targets would not be achieved, shortly proved to be right as the Parliament amended 
the Law on State Budget as regards economic forecasts for this year (Romanian only). 
Unless Government finds new sources of funding or gives up on some of its social 
and economic programs, it would have to resort again to the help of National Bank of 
Moldova, which as already mentioned might have disastrous consequences.  
 
Besides funding domestic policies it is also necessary to reimburse foreign debt. It 
would be nearly impossible to restructure those debts without an agreement with IMF. 
Given the lack of foreign preferential credits, there is no way Government would 
manage to meet its financial commitments other than to dig into National Bank's 
foreign currency reserves. However, exhausting those resources would propel the 
prices further upwards and give rise to speculations on the national currency market. 
Among the immediate effects of such a more one may expect swelling prices, 
depreciation of the national currency, and most importantly more expensive imports 
of strategic goods on the eve of winter.  
 
Remittances coming from Moldovan citizens working abroad would lower those 
risks, however Moldovans might well decide to keep the currency in their pockets if 
they smell price hike. This in turn would wield extra pressure on the exchange rate. 
Internal debt is already too high. Even if Government manages to balance its external 
financial position, it will do so on the expense of the internal one. Depending on the 
gravity of economic crisis, it may morph into a social and political crisis.  
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Currency Market: New Challenges 
Veaceslav Negruta, 1 December 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
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The evolutions on the internal currency market at the end of November gave a lot of 
headaches to the local economic agents, especially to those whose activity depends 
directly or indirectly on Moldovan Leu's correlation with other foreign currencies. 
The US Dollar's spectacular fluctuations against other foreign currencies put financial 
markets and analysts on fire, also testing the nerves of some actors on the local 
market.  
The Dollar's latest significant "fall" took place on Wednesday and Thursday, on 24 
and 25 November, as a result of the declarations of some officials of the Central Bank 
of Russia about their intentions to increase the share of the Euro in the structure of its 
currency reserves from 30 to 40 percent in the Dollar's disfavour. The international 
financial market reacted promptly. China had previously announced its preferences 
for the Euro, which also troubled the waters on the financial markets.  
 
However, the main reason for the Dollar's "fall" should be looked for in the USA. 
Probably many actors that play on the currency market have realized that the USA is 
interested in the Dollar's weakness in order to finance partially its war costs, finance 
the huge budget deficit and create competitive advantages on the internal and external 
markets for the American producers. The contradictory statements of the Minister of 
Finance and the Head of the US Federal Reserves with regard to the Dollar's future 
amplify these uncertainties. Moreover, the fears related to the high levels of both trade 
and current account deficits of the United States have generated a decreasing trend of 
the American currency. Monetary markets fear now that the decline that has been 
taking place so far gradually and orderly could become chaotic, with unpredictable 
consequences.  
 
The hardest blow to the US dollar could be caused by the entering into force of the 
agreement of December 2003 between the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and 
the Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the payment in Euro for the import of 
Russian natural gases. Respectively, there could take place an unprecedented 
replacement of the US Dollar with Euro in the energy resources import/export 
transactions, this segment of the international market being traditionally dominated by 
the Dollar. The decision of the Central Bank of Russia to increase the share of the 
European currency in the total amount of its currency reserves is an alarming signal 
for its energy sector.  
 
In case of US Dollar's depreciation, a new wave of price hike on energy resources is 
not excluded, or a more accelerated substitution of the Euro for the Dollar could 
become reality. Let us take a look at the Moldovan currency market. Although the 
Dollar loses its position and value on all international and national markets, the 
Leu/Dollar correlation remains relatively stable, even with a small depreciation of the 
Leu. This could be explained by the seasonal factor i.e. that the demand for dollars 
increased on the eve of winter (we must pay for the import of energy resources). But 
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this explanation is not sufficient. It seems that the target for Leu's appreciation against 
the Dollar was set by President Vladimir Voronin at the Government meeting of 3  
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November 2004, when he brought harsh criticism to the National Bank and personally 
to its Governor Leonid Talmaci.  
 
The Head of the State harshly criticized the activity of those NBM officers that 
allowed for Leu's appreciation, although the appreciation took place 5-6 months 
before. Back then, when the exporters and the population dependant on the external 
money transfers were suffering losses due to the Leu' appreciation, few were those 
that criticized the situation on the currency market (nobody at all from among the 
governors). For these reasons, the President's criticism was a little belated. 
Nevertheless, the criticism had its effects: today the Moldovan currency market does 
not react in the same way as practically all international and national markets do to 
the Dollar's evolution.  
 
In the conditions in which the dollars are "thrown out" from international assets in the 
entire world, the Republic of Moldova becomes the place that absorbs the Dollar. The 
dollar throwing out phenomenon is obvious especially in Russia. Thus, those dollars 
could reach Moldova through economic agents, including commercial banks, which 
could bring about a new wave of pressure on the Leu/Dollar correlation.  
 
It is important to understand the macroeconomic impact of the evolutions on the 
international currency market on Moldova's balance of payments. In the conditions in 
which most export contracts have prices fixed in Dollars, and import prices (except 
energy resources) in Euros (or related to the Euro), we have an increasingly disastrous 
situation with regard to the trade balance. Its deficit is continuously growing, 
especially due to the depreciation of the Dollar against the Euro. And the 
consequences of Leu's appreciation allowed for an increase in the trade deficit, which 
registered a record amount of USD 515 million in the nine months of this year, as 
well as an increase in the current account deficit.  
 
At the same time, controlled currency regime (promoted, in fact, by NBM) has 
protected the internal currency market against the speculative flows and the multitude 
of negative evolutions on the international financial markets. NBM should change the 
frequency of its interventions on the currency market and offer an increased flexibility 
to the exchange rate. It is true that there is the option of using temporary controls, 
such as minimal obligatory reserves or restrictions in the loan provision policy. 
Perhaps the market players know them and are aware of what measures the central 
bank could adopt, should things go wrong at some point.  
 
The Republic of Moldova is approaching more and more to the critical point when it 
must take a decision regarding the acknowledgement and acceptance of the increasing 
role of Euro in the world as well as in the Republic of Moldova. The delay in doing 
this has already degenerated in "missed opportunities". The current political and 
economic contexts will most likely not interfere with making such a decision.  
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Inflation rate gives headache 
Iurie Gotisan, 16 December 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 43, November 29 - December 12, 2004 
 
 
For the third time in 2004 monthly inflation rate exceeded 1% (1.1% - in April, 2.2% 
- October, 1.8% - November). One might seem surprised. One might as well express 
lingering concerns that the targeted inflation rate for the year would not be achieved, 
amidst a cumulative price hike of 10.7% in the first 10 months of the year.  
 
Better still one might acknowledge that swelling inflation comes as no surprise. To 
put it differently, National Bank informed IMF and WB that Republic of Moldova 
might miss the 9% inflation target. Afterwards "official sources" talked to media of a 
different target, i.e. 10%. Noteworthy, if Central Bank had not taken the decision to 
let Leu appreciate, probably the cumulative inflation rate for 2004 would have been 
twice as big.  
 
As a rule upon price hike, interest rates go up and not down. It is all-too-clear: Leu 
depreciation, meaning cheaper imports, seeks to reduce inflation, whereas interest 
rates seek to diminish the risk of speculative capital inflow.  
 
Still, latest developments on the monetary market in 2004 marked by price hike 
(implicitly of the inflation) amidst considerable Leu appreciation, signals some risks 
as regards National Bank activity. We believe that appreciation of the exchange rate 
in real terms was brought about by National Bank promoted monetary policy of 
rigorous control of monetary base (M0). One may say that during the aforesaid period 
National Bank had a more of a directive policy.  
 
At the same time, average interest rate on deposits surged (from 16.8% to 17%), 
especially due to growing deposits in Lei by natural entities. However, it is impossible 
to boost savings unless there are positive interest rates in real terms, while confidence 
in the national currency would drop if nominal interests on deposits did not exceed 
inflation rate.  
 
Financial analysts say depreciation of US dollar would boost economic growth, 
however inflationist risk would eventually lead to restrictive economic policies 
mainly by raising interest rates, which would result in an inflow of foreign capital and 
investments, that in turn would boost production and create new jobs.  
 
Ok, then why it is so important for the inflation not to go astray too much from the 
initial course? It is because a substantial deviation would cost us some dear points of 
credibility would inhibit investors and creditors. Under the circumstances when 
inflation pushes us to the outskirts of CIS countries, any delay would be sanctioned 
harshly by the international community.  
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Having said that, we should not forget that monetary authorities stated in spring that 
under a pessimist scenario, they would categorically shoot for the target even if it 
were on the expense of slowing down economic growth. They explained that partially 
sacrificing economic growth in 2004 would consolidate the growth on a long term, 
which is exactly what Moldova needs to bridge the gap. Unfortunately, the things are 
exactly opposite. We would over-perform on economic growth and under-perform on 
inflation.  
 
Finally we have one last issue to discuss. NBM claims that inflation would go down at 
the end of 2004, however it predicts that inflation decline would halt temporarily early 
next year as a result of surging energy price and high oil price. Albeit we agree in 
principle with that position, still skyrocketed prices on food are likely to propel a 
general price hike.  
 
Noteworthy, in September and October bread and meat manufacturers were hardly 
persuaded to adjourn or diminish the price hike. In order to be more persuasive, 
Government gave up on important sources of revenues, it temporarily reduced by half 
the customs tax on certain food products. Inevitably, the realities would prove that 
administrative measures have a limited impact.  
 
After elections nothing would stop manufacturers to raise the prices. Inflationist 
outburst would last for as long as the money from electoral charity would last. And 
why is it that food counts more than energy when it comes to inflation? That is 
because in 2005 consumption basket at the Statistics Department, the energy price 
would have the reduced weight of 2003, whereas food would have the high weight it 
used to. According to this scheme, it is not the energy that fuels inflation, but rather 
meat, bread and diary.  
 
The end of the year casts a glimpse many politicians refuse to see: monetary policy 
has reached its limits in administering economy. Furthermore, reduction of arrears is 
necessary for a healthy drop of inflation.  
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